The papers below focus on the theory of meaning for noun phrases. In recent philosophy of language (since the 1970's) the orthodox view has been that names and deictic terms are semantically distinct from singular definite descriptions, which have the semantic features characteristic of quantified noun phrases. It is widely believed that names and deictic terms, unlike complex non-lexical noun phrases, lack descriptive senses. The most influential current account of the semantics of these terms is direct-reference theory, which reduces the sense or content of a simple lexical noun phrase to its referent.
I believe that the current understanding of singular-term semantics is mistaken.. I develop in these papers, and in works in progress, a semantic theory--starting from names, moving to deictic terms, and expanding to noun phrases in general--that yields quantity and sense conditions for all noun phrases. These conditions determine, at circumstances of evaluation, extensions of the same type for all noun phrases.
"On Sense and Reflexivity" offers the answer to a crucial question that was posed, and left without a satisfactory answer, by Gottlob Frege in "On Sense and Reference" (1892): What is the sense of a proper name? The century-long failure to answer this question has been the main motivation and support for recent nondescriptional accounts of lexical singular terms.
On Sense and Reflexivity This is a penultimate draft. Please cite the published paper in The Journal of Philosophy 98 (July 2001) 351-364.
"Mill-Frege Compatibilism" returns to the 19th century roots of the division between direct-reference theorists and sense theorists. It finds that Mill was not a "Millian," as the label is currently applied to direct-reference theorists.
Mill-Frege Compatibilism This is a penultimate draft. Please cite the published paper in Journal of Philosophical Research 27 (2002) 567-576.
"The Semantics of Rigid Designation" criticizes arguments of Saul Kripke and David Kaplan from the rigid designation of names (Kripke) and deictic terms (Kaplan) to the conclusion that these terms must lack descriptive senses. It shows, on the contrary, that the distinctive reflexive senses of these terms provide the explanation of their rigid designation.
The Semantics of Rigid Designation This is a penultimate draft. Please cite the published paper in Ratio 16 (March 2003) 33-48.
"What Was Kripke's Mistake?" is about an apparent inconsistency in Naming and Necessity. If names lack descriptive senses, then there seems to be no way for the necessarily true identities expressed with two names to be known empirically. Kripke, however, claimed both that names are nondescriptional and that the identities are known empirically. Scott Soames argues that Kripke's mistake was his claim that these identities are known empirically. This essay argues that Kripke's mistake was his claim that names are nondescriptional. Kripke's claim turns out to have been a hasty generalization formed on the basis of an incomplete survey of the possible senses for names.
What Was Kripke's Mistake? (Colloquium paper presented at the Central Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association in Cleveland, April 25, 2003.)
"Singular-Term Semantics Simplified" refutes the view originated by Bertrand Russell that names have semantic values (extensions) of a different type from those of definite descriptions. I argue that names and deictic terms have extensions of the same type as definite descriptions--in fact, of the same type as all other noun phrases.
Singular-Term Semantics Simplified (Colloquium paper presented at the Pacific Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association in San Francisco, April 6, 2007.)
"Unified Semantics of Singular Terms" argues that there is a single type of value for all noun phrases that dissolves the seemingly intractable difficulties that have long beset singular-term semantics.
Unified Semantics of Singular Terms This is a penultimate draft. Please cite the published paper in The Philosophical Quarterly 57 (July 2007) 363-373.