Guatemalan Elections ’95 On the Path to Peace?

John D. Abell
Randolph-Macon Woman’s College

A shorter version of this article originally appeared in LASA (Latin American Studies Association) Forum, Vol. XXVI No. 4 (Winter 1996), pp. 11-16.  This version is reprinted with LASA's permission.

Note: The author was in Guatemala for the November 12 general elections as a member of the United States Citizen Independent Election Observer Mission team, organized by the Center for Global Education, Ecumenical Program on Central America and the Caribbean (EPICA), The Network in Solidarity with the Peoples of Guatemala (NISGUA), the Guatemala News and Information Bureau, and Global Exchange . The observer team was stationed in six departments throughout the country: Alta Verapaz, Chimaltenango, Sololá, Quetzaltenango, Quiché and Guatemala City. The following narrative examines some of the background issues pertinent to the elections and provides eyewitness coverage and analysis of election day events.

Historical Significance of the Elections.

On Sunday, November 12, while the United States Park Service was turning visitors away from the Grand Canyon and other popular tourist attractions around the country because of the federal budget impasse, voters in Guatemala were casting ballots in an historic general election. At stake was nearly every elected position in the country: President and Vice President, every seat in Congress, representation in the Central American Parliament and mayoral heads of 300 municipalities.

Of particular interest to the U.S. is the fact that these were the first general elections to take place since the signing of the NAFTA accords on January 1, 1994, which effectively shifted the southern boundary for north-south trade from the Río Grande to the Mexico-Guatemala border. They were also the first elections since the signing in March and April of 1994 of three separate accords that are part of on-going peace negotiations between the government and the rebel forces of the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG). The NAFTA accords and the Guatemalan peace process are not at all unconnected. The success of NAFTA depends critically, as we have recently seen, on the political and economic stability of Mexico. The Zapatista rebellion in the southern Mexican state of Chiapas, across the border from Guatemala, revealed just how fragile the Mexican political and economic scene really are.

The problems of the Zapatistas are the same as those of the indigenous Mayan communities of Guatemala: land, food, jobs, human rights, and democracy, or more specifically, the lack of those things. History has shown, and neither Guatemala nor Mexico are exceptions to the pattern, that when voices are not heard, when living conditions become intolerable, and when one's oppressors act with total impunity, many will respond in the only manner they can think of--they will take up arms. The 35 year old rebel insurgency and military counter-insurgency in Guatemala is the unfortunate result of such a decision. Over the years, nearly 440 Mayan villages have simply been eliminated from the Guatemalan map, approximately 200,000 individuals (mostly indigenous and Ladino¹ poor) have been killed or disappeared at the hands of the military or extrajudicial death squads (though the military would say otherwise), and over one million people have been displaced, either internally or externally (especially in refugee camps in Chiapas) as access to the above basic rights have been contested.²

Such a situation is unacceptable not only for moral reasons, but for economic and political reasons, as well. NAFTA is unworkable as long as there is an on-going rebellion in southern Mexico. An extended NAFTA that would incorporate the rest of Latin America into a powerful trading block, that U.S. President Clinton and the business community envisions, is even more unworkable as long as there is violence and impunity in Guatemala and other countries of the region. Hence, there is more at stake in the peace negotiations in Guatemala than merely lifting the yolk of oppression to which the Mayans have been subjected for nearly 500 years. A more cynical view would suggest that were it not for the international economic interests involved, and because of the pressure they have brought to bear on the military of Guatemala, the peace process would never have gotten off the ground.

Regardless, negotiations are under way and the top two vote-getters in the November 12 elections, Alvaro Arzú of the PAN party (Party of National Advancement, with 36% of the vote) and Alfonso Portillo of the FRG party (Guatemalan Republican Front, with 22% of the vote), have each declared that they will comply with the peace accords.³ The winner of the January run-off election will have a chance to put words into actions.

The Participation of the Democratic Left.

Another important aspect of the elections, and one that made them worthy of the attention of international observers, was that for the first time since the CIA-led coup in 1954, the democratic left participated in the electoral process. Primarily because of fear of brutal repression under the military governments of the 1970s and 1980s and even after the civilian elections of 1985, popular movements and the URNG have generally seen many risks, but few gains to be had from open political participation. However, the hint of a political opening under current President Ramiro de León Carpio (former Human Rights Ombudsman under president Jorge Serrano), coupled with UN observers on the ground to facilitate the peace process, seem to have given Guatemalans the confidence to politically organize on a scale not seen in nearly half a century.

A political party appeared on the scene for the first time, calling itself the New Guatemala Democratic Front (FDNG). It has the support of those who have never had political voices before in Guatemala; unions, Mayan organizations, human rights groups, women's groups, marginal communities and other popular groups. It also has the support of the URNG, though the two groups have denied any formal linkages. The FDNG admits to having had discussions with the guerrillas, but as General Coordinator of the Front, Antonio Móvil has pointed out, so have the military and other political parties. In spite of the obvious overlapping constituencies, there is no formal alliance, he insists, a point that can not be overemphasized in a country in which one’s politics and ideology can easily result in a late-night appointment with a death-squad if they run counter to the prevailing norms.⁴

The FDNG was organized partly out of concern of the strong FRG (Guatemalan Republican Front) showing in the special congressional elections in 1994 (following President Ramiro de Leon Carpio's political house-cleaning). The FRG is the party of former general Ríos Montt who assumed the presidency in a military coup from 1982-83 and, whose months in office were among the bloodiest in the country's history. The party won 40% of the seats in congress on the basis of support of only 6% of the electorate, and Montt himself used the victory to propel himself into the Presidency of the Congress. When Montt announced his formal candidacy for president this year, the speed of organization of the FDNG was accelerated. The Supreme Electoral Council (TSE) later determined that his candidacy was illegal under the Guatemalan constitution (Article 186), which bars former coup leaders from running for president.⁵

His formal departure might have been viewed with relief by many, but his indirect presence at the top of the FRG ticket was evidenced by the roadside campaign posters showing a grim-faced Montt, standing in the middle of (official) presidential candidate Portillo and his vice-presidential candidate (retired) Colonel Carlos Anibal Méndez. Other campaign literature was even less subtle; "Portillo a la presidencia, Ríos Montt al poder!" the slogans read (Portillo to the presidency, Rios Montt to the power!). The message seemed clear--with or without constitutional sanction, a vote for the FRG was a vote for Montt.⁶ Furthermore, the fact that in the congressional elections the FRG assumed so much power on the basis of such a low voter turnout was a clear indicator to the URNG and other groups that their former policy of abstentionism, while conceivably earning them a position on the high moral ground, was doing nothing to promote any of their causes. In fact, a success by the FRG in the general elections might prove to be a disaster.

A common misperception is that the new FDNG party represents a unified voice of the left. Indeed, its program "based on respect for human rights, promotion of gender equality, respect for multicultural practices, demilitarization, devolution of state power to local governments, efforts to address the roots of poverty, environmental protection, and support for the peace process," was the most progressive platform available to the electorate in decades.⁷ Nevertheless, it proved to be quite difficult to consolidate all of the disparate groups into a "rainbow coalition." Just because indigenous groups, labor unions and members of the progressive business community, for example, all felt disaffected and disenfranchised by the system, did not mean that they would easily coalesce into a unified political front. In fact, many went their separate ways, even before the party officially submitted its paperwork to the TSE on July 1. A number went on to form their own civic committees (comités civicos) and ran independent candidates in the mayoral races.⁸

On the other hand, the difficulties of the FDNG points to the obvious strength of the more established parties, and even more importantly, to the existent strength of some indigenous groups. For example, in Santiago Atitlán, a community with an indigenous population of 95%, there were no mayoral candidates from either the FDNG or a civic committee. Rather, the DCG (Christian Democracy of Guatemala) won at all levels (president, congressional deputy, and mayor). A community leader we spoke with suggested that the DCG remains a strong influence there because this was the party of Vinicio Cerezo, the president who ordered the closing of the military base at the edge of town following the infamous 1990 massacre. For the community, this was a bold move that will forever be appreciated. The DCG mayor-elect, Manuel Sisay, a Cakchiquel man, is the latest in a long line of indigenous mayors. Santiago's last ladino mayor was in 1982.

Interestingly, Sisay is also the head of the local vigilancia group (Jefe de las Patrullas) which recently replaced the local police force, a move, which, when taken in conjunction with the closing of the military base has brought a period of relative calm to this former troubled community.⁹

In other communities such as Sololá, the indigenous (Cakchiquel) population was reasonably well organized, yet had not been able to place one of their own people into the mayor's office in spite of representing 95% of the population. For years, their voices were filtered through an indigenous mayor's office (what we in the U.S. might call a shadow government) located across the street from the official mayor's office. The problems associated with this unusual arrangement are like a microcosm of the problems facing the entire country. For decades, the minority ladino population, in conjunction with the military, have prevented the Cakchiquel from full participation in society. As an example, Cakchiquel leaders operating through the auspices of the indigenous mayor's office, sought European financing to help with the creation of a new agricultural market place (the current one is woefully inadequate and the official mayor's office has been totally unresponsive on this issue). The loan was signed, sealed and ready for delivery, when at the last moment, the town officials intervened to prevent the agreement from taking place. According to Cakchiquel leaders we spoke with, for local ladino officials, this was simply too much autonomy to be granted to the indigenous population, therefore, they took the measures necessary to maintain the status quo.¹⁰

Fed up with such political arrangements, the Cakchiquel of Sololá organized a civic committee (well in advance of the formation of the FDNG), calling itself the Democratic Union of Sololá (SUD) and fielded a candidate for mayor. Following the creation of the FDNG, they also ran an indigenous candidate for congressional deputy under the FDNG banner. On November 12, the SUD candidate easily beat all other national party candidates by a 3 to 1 margin, but the FDNG deputy narrowly lost to the PAN candidate.

Across the country, on election day, the FDNG won only 4 mayoral seats while various civic committees won only 14 out of 176 mayoral races in which there were civic committees registered; evidence of the difficulty in competing with the entrenched national parties and perhaps evidence that indeed, the FDNG was not the only voice of all the previously disenfranchised voters. One explanation for the FDNG's poor showing (and perhaps for some of the committees as well) is that given the late date at which the FDNG entered the race, there were less than two months before the registration deadline (August 12) and less than four months before the actual elections (November 12) to organize and educate their constituency. Seen in this way, one could argue that these results were evidence of a fairly respectable showing. There are now going to be 18 communities who will be represented by leaders whose base of political support was locally determined and truly representative. The Cakchiquel of Sololá are no doubt pleased with the outcome.

In spite of its failure to unite all of the formerly disenfranchised groups, the FDNG was nevertheless a serious contender for the national offices. A carefully selected ticket offered the widest possible appeal to progressive voters of all political stripes. The presidential candidate, an economist by the name of Jorge González del Valle, had vast experience in the world of international finance, having served as Latin American director of the IMF and, interestingly, as president of Guatemala’s central bank under Rios Montt. He sharply disagrees with the neoliberal policies of the institutions he once served and suggested in an interview that he felt that it was possible for Guatemala to become a participant in the global economy without having to adopt harsh trickle-down economic policies.¹¹

In order to encourage support from the indigenous communities, a Mayan activist was chosen for the vice-presidential ticket. Juan León, a teacher from Quiché, has worked for years in various organizations (most recently with Defensoría Maya) to promote the rights of the indigenous population. In accepting his party’s nomination, he was quick to acknowledge gratitude that for "the first time a political front has adopted the aspirations of the indigenous peoples." Nevertheless, he doesn’t have much faith in the overall political process.

"This system is not ours, it’s not our way of choosing authorities," he said, "but by entering this system and fighting for space within it, we create the possibility that, in the future, the Mayan peoples can choose their authorities in the manner they wish."¹²

Pre-Election Problems: Significant or Inconsequential?

The whole electoral process, at least superficially, had the appearance of a relatively healthy democratic affair, the Montt campaign notwithstanding. However, there were indeed significant problems along the way, such as the unfortunate massacre at Cobán, in which 11 villagers were killed and 20 others were wounded just two weeks before the election. Evidence suggests, however, that this was not necessarily an attempt at electoral intimidation, just another in a long line of misunderstandings that occur when teenagers are given automatic weapons and military indoctrination instead of schoolbooks and education. However, according to the FDNG vice-presidential candidate Juan León, the military and civilian defense patrols had been quite active in the weeks leading up to the elections threatening voters not to vote for the FDNG.¹³

For its part, the URNG called a cease-fire for the two week period leading up to (and through) the election. The kidnapping of Rigoberta Menchu's nephew might have been the political intimidation story of the election (probably of the whole year) but, as it turned out, the abduction was simply the result of a domestic monetary squabble. Finally, it should be mentioned as well, that the pace of extrajudicial killings did not slacken noticeably in honor of the elections--if anything, there was an acceleration in the latter part of the year. Through June of this year there had been nearly 800 killings, yet by November, the total had grown to 1400 (an increase from 133/month to 150/month).¹⁴

Election Day Results: Analysis and Observations.

On election day, things were relatively calm, by Guatemalan standards. A particular concern centered on whether the military or civilian defense patrols would play a visible and perhaps threatening role, especially given Juan León's observations in the days leading up to the elections. Fortunately, the military had been confined, for the most part, to its barracks, and there were few instances of overt polling station intimidation. However, some members of the United Nations Human Rights verification team stationed in Cobán reported to us that they had seen plainclothes armed men (non-locals) patrolling nearby; something which would not have been comforting to the villagers, given the recent massacre.

The irregularities our observation team encountered were probably "minor" given the potentially volatile nature of the event, at least taken individually--however, if all such incidents were extrapolated across all the polling stations around the country, they may well have added up to something substantive. As an example, there was the case of an elderly indigenous man who was turned away from the voting table at five minutes before the polls closed. One of our team members pointed out to the officials that according to his watch, it was only 5:55 PM. They were not impressed. When my colleague noticed that one of the officials' watches said the exact same time, and pointed it out to him, he just shrugged and turned the old man away. Or, there was the case of the young mother (a Cakchiquel woman) who had waited for over an hour (beyond the closing time) to cast her vote, only to be told that she was at the wrong table. The correct table, because it had not experienced such long lines, had closed promptly at 6:00 PM, and would not allow her to vote, in spite of our entreaties. She reacted quite stoically, just as her people have done for nearly 500 years in the face of such indignities. She gathered herself, her belongings and her child and quietly walked out of the polling station.

Another, potentially more serious incident (especially if it was being replicated across the country) was noted whereby a man who was dressed in military style clothing was observed casting a vote. It was not our position to do something as rash as to ask to see his I.D., but since military personnel are not allowed to vote, this merited more attention.¹⁵ One of our observers, who attempted to move in for a closer look, had her line of vision blocked by a couple of fiscales (paid political poll watchers) who tried to distract her attention and stood in front of her. She was able to note, nevertheless, that the man did not dip the end of his finger into the inkwell (which would have identified him as having already casting a vote), enabling him, of course, to cast other votes at other locations.

While such incidents were difficult for us to internalize, we sensed that a greater concern here was what we came to label "structural fraud;" irregularities that didn't involve the violation of any particular rules, but which, nevertheless had the effect of preventing large segments of the population from participating in the elections. For example, according to Guatemalan law, registration and voting must take place where your cédula (national I.D. card) was issued. Unlike in the U.S., where residency can be established in a new community with relative ease, voters in Guatemala must travel, often long distances, usually to their place of birth to register and vote--two separate trips for new voters. For those without transportation or money, or for those who have families and work that cannot wait, such travel is nearly impossible. A related problem is that many Guatemalans simply remain undocumented because of the 34 years of war and are hesitant to come forward out of fear of reprisal.

The most common occurrence involved a voter presenting his or her voting card to the election official only to be told that even though they indeed had a valid card and had come to the correct table, their name was not on the Padrón Electoral (the official roll) and could therefore not vote. TSE officials later told us that this was a problem limited primarily to those who had registered prior to 1984. For those registering after that date, this was less of a problem. Our concern with their nonchalant view of this situation was that if they were well aware of this problem, then they should have been able to correct it--at a minimum, they could have put out public notices to the electorate encouraging those having registered before 1984 to check with local officials to confirm their status.

As another example of structural fraud, there are strict rules about the manner in which a ballot may be marked for the candidate of your choice. For this election there were 19 candidates for national office from which to choose. The party emblems all appeared in little 1x2 inch rectangle boxes on a regular-sized sheet of paper that must be carefully marked with an X. If the X were to accidentally stray beyond the border of the intended box, then it could be declared a null ballot by the officials at that voting table. For seasoned voters, this was an inconsequential concern, but for the thousands of indigenous people who were participating for the first time and who had never held a writing implement of any kind in their hand before, the thick black crayon (like we all used in kindergarten) was quite unwieldy and strayed beyond the borders with alarming frequency.¹⁶ At one table in Sololá, over half of all ballots were ruled invalid, the majority of which had been cast for FDNG or SUD candidates, for the most part by the indigenous newcomers.

The actual vote counting and determination of whether a ballot was legitimate or not (as in the case of stray Xs) fell to the Junta Receptora de Votación (JRV - the officials at each voting table). The JRV consisted of a president, secretary and vocal (member at large) and was assisted by an alguacil (an official poll watcher appointed by the TSE--presumably not affiliated with any particular party). In addition, each table had paid political representatives of each party, known as fiscales, on hand to observe the proceedings. In a world without bias, this arrangement should have been adequate to ensure an election free from fraud and irregularities. In fact, the presence of international observers would have been something of a redundancy, because the presence of all of the various party fiscales would have helped to assure that no one was going to cheat their candidate in any way. Unfortunately, not all 23 parties¹⁷ had the personnel or finances to place fiscales at all the many individual tables around the country. The better organized parties, PAN, FRG, the National Alliance and even the FDNG to some extent, were well represented, while others simply had no presence at all at the tables.

During the actual vote counting, the utility of the fiscales became most apparent. When the JRV president pulled a ballot from the bag and presented it for consideration, if the X was clean and within the boundaries, then everyone would quickly acknowledge this fact and the ballot would be placed in the "clean" stack. If there was a questionable marking, such as a stray X, then the discussions among the JRV and the fiscales might become quite lively. My impression of the table where I spent most of the evening (at a gymnasium in Sololá) during the vote counting was that both the officials and the fiscales were well intentioned and honest. Even the slightest stray marking was debated to the point of exhaustion, but amazingly few ballots were declared null. The majority of stray marks came from individuals having cast a vote for the indigenous candidate, not surprisingly, and when these ballots came up for consideration, the SUD fiscal, a local Cakchiquel woman, would defend with great spirit and eloquence the validity of those ballots based on the obvious intent of the voter. Amazingly, her arguments seemed to prevail most of the time. At the table mentioned above, where over half of the ballots were rejected, the SUD fiscal was not nearly so assertive and thus the major parties tended to prevail.¹⁸

The remaining incident of note was the power outage that occurred shortly past midnight, right in the middle of the vote counting. 90% of the country was cast into darkness which lasted up to three hours in some locations! A few areas including Jutiapa, Cobán, and eastern portions of the state of Quiché experienced temporary outages as early as 10:30 PM. A number of groups including the FDNG and some of the smaller political parties have cried foul. Interestingly, the PAN party, which had over 65% of the vote prior to the blackout, yet emerged from the blackout with only 36% of the vote, was not among those expressing concern. Since they fared so well overall, apparently they were not interested in contributing to the discussions regarding the power outage or other electoral problems that might cast doubt as to the legitimacy of the results. There are two official versions of the power outage story. One, is that a tree fell on a power line, an account that was quickly discounted by the majority of the population, needless to say. An electrician working for the country's power company (INDE) explained that there were simply no trees near the main power lines and that, at any rate, there existed an automatic back-up system to compensate for any losses.¹⁹ The other version is that with so many buildings using electricity that late at night, it put a strain on the generating capacity of the nation's electric utility. However, the fact that Guatemala is a net exporter of electricity to El Salvador casts a bit of doubt on that theory. Besides, the country relies primarily on hydroelectric power and with the rainy season just ended, the reservoirs were filled with enough water to provide sufficient capacity.

The Fairness Issue

The Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE) and President de Leon Carpio have declared the elections a success. They begrudgingly admitted that there were isolated irregularities, but none were of such magnitude as to necessitate a recount of the votes. Their view of the power outage seems to be that this is something that happens frequently in a developing country and thus are treating it as a non-issue. According to reports on Guatemalan television, the final results had the approval of the Organization of American States (OAS) which had election observers stationed around the country, however, there was no mention of the questions raised by observers from the European Economic Community (EEC) and the United States Citizen Independent Election Observer Mission (USCIEOM) as though these groups didn't even participate. In fact, a government official we spoke with didn't attempt to hide from us his feelings that all of the observer groups were likely to be biased, with the possible exception of the OAS. It is not hard to imagine that to entrenched sectors of Guatemalan society, like the oligarchy (as represented by groups like CACIF - Chambers of Agriculture, Commerce, Industry and Finance), the military and the government, our mere presence (overseeing their elections) represented a serious challenge to their generally unquestioned authority.

In its official press release the day after the elections, the OAS delegation reported that indeed the elections took place "in an atmosphere of tranquility, transparency, liberty and security." To the extent it had any concerns at all, they were focused in a limited way on the issue of the "significant distances separating voters from the polling stations."²⁰ The EU used nearly identical language to describe the elections; that they were carried out "with serenity, transparency and liberty," but went on to note a number of problems. Their primary concerns were with structural issues, such as those identified throughout this analysis. Like the OAS, the EU noted that the distances between home and polling station were too far for most Guatemalans and therefore discouraged participation. Inadequate transportation simply accentuated this problem. Also mentioned was the fact (noted by our group as well) that voters generally had no one to turn to for official help at the polling stations. In addition, the officials at each table were occasionally poorly informed as to logistics and simply not helpful. In its press release, it noted "isolated acts of proselytization and intimidation" at the polling stations. Finally, in regard to the power outage, it was noted that this was a matter of grave concern to a number of the political parties and to the local media, though they (the EU) stopped short of claiming that it affected the "scrutiny" of the vote.²¹

The official statement of the USCIEOM regarding the elections applauded "the majority of Guatemalans for their participation in this transition election, the TSE for a smoothly run voting process, and the non-governmental organizations for their efforts at civic education." It was especially impressed by the relatively high levels of participation of indigenous and women's groups. "Observers were concerned, however," the statement continued, "by the atmosphere in which the electoral contest took place, some of the irregularities noticed on voting day, and the serious disturbances that ensued afterward."²²

The ensuing disturbances include a number of denunciations, turned violent (tire burning, ballot burning and attacks on municipal buildings), in a at least eleven municipalities in which the legitimacy of the mayoral race outcomes was challenged. For example in Mixco, just outside of Guatemala City, 14 political parties joined forces to denounce that the PAN party had not legitimately won the municipal race. Among the complaints was that PAN had prior knowledge of the blackout and was prepared to quickly deliver flashlights and candles to their fiscales the minute the darkness struck.²³

Still To Come

The outcome of the presidential race will not be settled until the runoff election on January 7. It is generally acknowledged that the U.S. has strongly supported the candidacy of Arzú and the PAN, the party of the so-called "modernizing right."²⁴ Arzú, the former mayor of Guatemala City, supports Guatemala's integration into the global economy through the adoption of neoliberal policies. He favors a "smaller, but stronger and more agile, civilian government, capable of directing infrastructure projects favoring export-oriented development."²⁵

What may come back to haunt him in the face-off with the FRG "hard-liners" is that he has dared to suggest that income taxes may need to be raised (currently among the lowest in this hemisphere) on the wealthiest Guatemalans in order to pay for social investment programs as required by the World Bank. It is a rare instance indeed, when a country is actually doing less than what the World Bank suggests is necessary in the social arena. Such reformist tendencies, along with his attempts to reach out to the center-left portion of the electorate (for example, by including in his campaign structure, advisors from the independent think tank ASIES), may have alienated the party from the powerful business community. On the other hand, he is thought to be the favorite of the "institutionalist" wing of the military, the faction that tends to support the on-going peace process and favors civilian-led democratic institutions of government as "necessary instruments for preserving stability."²⁶

The tradition in Guatemala is that the second place finisher (the FRG in this case) is typically able to form coalitions with the smaller parties and overcome the first-round deficit in the run-off elections. If Rios Montt's legacy is so tainted, then why would anyone throw their support behind him? First of all, he has the support of the "hard-line" military (those who feel that the on-going peace talks are impediments in the way of the military's efforts to once and for all eliminate the last vestiges of communist subversion in the country), as well as the evangelical Christian right (given his membership in the California-based Church of the Word).²⁷ The former can deliver the political clout needed to overcome the opposition forces and the latter can provide a pipeline of financial support.²⁸ Furthermore, he has a reputation as being a crusader against crime and corruption, items which are of real concern to every citizen of Guatemala City right now. Since the city is where the majority of the total vote will come from, and since the indigenous population will not likely mobilize for another election to the extent they did in November, especially given their choices, Montt's FRG party has a realistic chance in the run-off.²⁹ However, it is entirely possible that the city vote could work against the FRG because this is where PAN has its greatest support, given that Arzú was the mayor of the city for a number of years. The runoffs will definitely be as interesting as the November elections.

The presidential winner will face a PAN working majority in the new congress (with 43 out of 80 seats), based on the latest results. The FRG will have the second largest number of seats (20 out of 80) and perhaps most interesting of all, the FDNG will have the third largest number of seats (6 out of 80). In one sense, the three party National Alliance (consisting of the DCG-Christian Democrats, UCN-Union of the National Center and PSD-Social Democrats) has more seats than the FDNG (10 out of 80), but they are actually split up among the three parties--the alliance structure was created primarily to improve the chances of their presidential candidate.³⁰ So while the FDNG only garnered four mayoral victories, its accomplishments at the national level are nothing short of miraculous. It had been projected early on that the party could not win more than one-half of one percent of the vote, yet it won over 6%--not enough to change the course of Guatemalan history, but enough to give the indigenous peoples, Ladino poor and others a voice within the establishment that has never been there before. The political opening thus continues to widen in Guatemala. In that sense, the elections can be seen as a victory for all. One can only hope that nothing will happen following the January run-off elections that might return Guatemala to the dark days of fear and oppression of an earlier generation.

Notes:

1. Not to be confused with Latino. Ladino is a term used primarily to refer to the non-indigenous, non-criollo peoples of Guatemala and southern Mexico. For more on this see, Jonas, Susanne, The Battle for Guatemala. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press (1991), p. 16 or Barry, Tom, Zapata's Revenge. Boston: South End Press (1995), p. 174.

2. Jonas, pp. 2, 155 and 182.

3. "Rosada cree que PAN o FRG cumplirán acuerdos de paz." Siglo Veintiuno (Guatemalan daily newspaper), Nov. 15, 1995, p. 5.

4. Stewart, Steve and David Loeb, "Elections 1995: The Democratic Left Enters the Ring," Report on Guatemala. Vol. 16 No. 3, (September 1995), p. 5, 14.

5. Ibid, pp. 3-4.

6. Lest there be any doubt as to whether Portillo has disavowed his leftist past (as a former supporter of the EGP - Guerrilla Army of the Poor), and as further evidence that a vote for the FRG is a vote for Montt, in response to a question about "how he could reconcile his leftist past and his current embrace of a bitter enemy of the left," Portillo replied, "The terms left and right have disappeared. We should no longer base ourselves in ideologies, but rather in principles. I believe that there is a coincidence of principles between what the General and I believe in." Infopress Centroamericana, "Guatemala, elecciones '95, p. 3.

7. Stewart and Loeb, p. 4.

8. It should be noted that not all civic committees waited until July to put forth their candidates--many were acting in advance of the formation of the FDNG and the debate that ensued and many were formed who had their own separate agendas, irrespective of the FDNG debate. Guatemalan law is rather progressive on this issue. While it takes 3000 signatures to initiate a new political party, it only takes 100 in a town to organize a civic committee. To some extent, this grants a degree of autonomy to local communities not always seen in other countries. In this election there were a total of 176 such committees sponsoring candidates for local office.

9. Do not confuse a local vigilancia group with the notorious civilian defense patrols (PACs), which were created by the military. The elimination of local police forces and subsequent replacement by vigilancia groups composed of prominent citizens who voluntarily patrol the community has proved to be successful for communities that are attempting to reassert local control over their own affairs. The groups patrol mostly at night and carry white flags and occasionally sticks. This new system has been recently instituted with success in San Lucas Toliman, another highlands community. A community leader I spoke with there was practically bursting with pride as he told us of his community's new found confidence and autonomy.

10. Interview with indigenous candidates for mayor (Pedro Iboy) and congressional deputy (Anastacio Jualzcas), (11/10/95, Sololá).

11. Private interview, 10/8/95.

12. Stewart and Loeb, p. 5.

13. Ibid, p. 14.

14. Source: Guatemalan Archdiocesan Human Rights Office.

15. This begs an additional line of inquiry, as to whether the fact that military personnel can't vote represents (what is labeled below as) structural fraud or not. Given that most of the conscripted soldiers are indigenous, there is a case that can be made that this exclusion simply prevents a sizable portion of the (indigenous) electorate from participating. On the other hand, there are those who might claim that if the military were allowed to vote, that the conscripts would be given specific instructions as to which candidates they should support, and that those candidates would not necessarily represent the best interests of the young soldiers.

16. The problems with both registration and voting were exacerbated for many Guatemalans due to a literacy rate of 50%. Printed election materials were written mostly in Spanish in spite of the fact that there are 21 additional indigenous languages used throughout the country.

17. There were three cases of parties which consolidated their support behind a common candidate, most notably, the National Alliance, consisting of the DCG (Christian Democracy of Guatemala), UCN (Union of the National Center) and the PSD (Social Democratic Party). There was also the PID (Party of Institutional Democracy) - FUN (National Unity Front) union and the PCN (Party of National Conciliation) - MPL (Patriotic Liberty Movement) union. Thus, there were 23 parties, but only 19 candidates appearing on the ballots.

18. Bear in mind that the fiscales do not have an actual vote regarding the validity of a ballot, should the debate reach such a point. The JRV officials have the final say.

19. Official Press Release of the US Citizen Election Observation Mission, Nov. 13, 1995.

20. "Comunicado De Prensa" (Official Press Release), Mision De Observacion Electoral De La Organizacion De Los Estados Americanos, Nov. 13, 1995.

21. "Comunicado De Prensa" (Official Press Release), Mision De Observacion Electoral De La Union Europea, Nov. 13, 1995

22. Official Press Release of the US Citizen Election Observation Mission, Nov. 13, 1995.

23. Ibid.

24. Infopress Centroamericana, "Guatemala, elecciones '95," p. 2.

25. Ibid, p.1.

26. Ibid, p. 7.

27. Jonas, p. 153,

28. Barry, Tom, Guatemala: A Country Guide. Albuquerque, N.M.: The Inter-Hemispheric Education Resource Center (1989), p. 103.

29. Another factor at work here is that the FDNG has announced that it does not plan to participate in alliances for the runoff election. Regarding the issue of the mobilization of the indigenous vote, the following statistics on abstention are revealing. The overall abstention rate was 53.5%. Guatemala City was above this rate, at 55.5%, while many of the indigenous states were below; such as Sololá with 42.7% (the lowest rate in the country), or Alta Verapaz (where Cobán is located) with 48.4%. Source: Siglo Veintiuno, Nov. 15, 1995, p. 3. The TSE has announced the expectation of a 65% abstention rate for the runoffs.

30. The FDNG also came in third in the presidential balloting with nearly 8% of the vote, if one distributes the National Alliance's 13% vote equally.

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